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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
1.1 Background of this study 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 is the supreme law of the country.1 In 
section 23(1), it is stated that “everyone” has a right to fair labour practices.2 The Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995(LRA) aims to promote economic development, social justice, and 
fair labour practices.3 A collective agreement is defined as a written agreement concerning 
terms and conditions of employment or other matters of mutual interest that are concluded 
between on the one hand, a registered trade union, and on the other hand, one or more 
employers, registered employers organisations or one or more employers organisations.4 
The Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 (BCEA) regulates specific minimum 
conditions of employment which apply to all employees in South Africa. These conditions 
may however, be changed by a collective agreement.5 Employers and employees have to 
negotiate with one another the wages and terms and conditions of employment. However, 
sectoral determinations are made for sectors where it is a challenge for workers to organise.6 
Collective agreements usually consist of terms and conditions of employment and other 
matters of mutual interest. 7These may be negotiated and agreed between trade unions as well 
as employers and their employers’ organisations.8 
Section 23(5) of the constitution promotes and upholds the right to collective bargaining.9 
The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995   “promotes orderly collective bargaining.”10This is 
evident from the case of Komatsu Southern Africa Pty Ltd v National Union of Metal 
                                                          
1 s2 of the constitution. 
2 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (hereafter the Constitution). 
3  s1 of the LRA . 
4 s213 of the LRA. 
5 s49 of the BCEA. 
6 Van Niekerk and Smit Law@work (2017) 423. 
7 s23(c) of the LRA. 
8Van Niekerk and Smit (n5) 297. 
9The constitution. 
10.s11-22 of the LRA. 
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Workers of South Africa.11 In this case it was stated that, employers and employees may 
bargain with each other at three different levels which are the plant level, the sectoral level 
and centralised level.12 One of the main aims of the LRA is to uphold collective bargaining at 
sectoral level.13 One or more trade unions or one or more employer’s organisations can form 
a bargaining council for their sector or area through adopting a constitution and registering 
the bargaining council with the Registrar of Labour Relations.14 Parties to the bargaining 
council may negotiate with the help of the bargaining council and must determine the terms 
and conditions of employment and the wages that will apply to those parties and, hopefully, 
take into account the relevant circumstances that pertain to that particular industry.15 
 Section 32 of the LRA regulates the extension of collective agreements concluded in a 
bargaining council to non-parties. Where the parties to the bargaining council have members 
that employ the majority of employees in the industry, then the Minister of Labour must upon 
request extend a collective agreement to non-parties.16 In circumstances where the 
mainstream threshold is not met, section 32(5) of the LRA states that the Minister may 
exercise his or her discretion. The Minister may extend a collective agreement to non-parties 
if he or she is satisfied that the parties to the bargaining council are sufficiently representative 
within the bargaining councils registered scope and  collective agreement were not extended, 
may compromise collective bargaining at a sectoral level or in the public service as a whole.17 
As of 2019, the registrar of Labour Relations determines the level of representation valid for 
two years and not every time a request for submission is extended.18 
1.2 Significance of the study 
The extension of collective agreements to a whole sector has far-reaching consequences for 
both employers and employees in a particular sector. The policy deliberations that are 
concerning issues of unemployment and inequality, for example the recent debate regarding 
the national minimum wage bears some similarities to an assessment of the extension of 
collective agreements.19 As mentioned however, by Murphy J in the Free Market Foundation 
                                                          
11 J 1437/2013 ZALLCJB (298). 
12 s27 of the LRA. See also J 1437/2013 ZALLCJB (n10). 
13s13 (4) (a-c) of the LRA. 
14s27 of the LRA. 
15Niekerk and Smit Law@work) (n5) 430. 
16 s32 (2) of the LRA. 
17 s32(2) of the LRA. 
18 Amended s49 of the LRA. 
19 Bhorat “The impact of sectoral minimum wage laws on employment, wages, and hours of work in South 
Africa (2013) Labour law journal. 
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v Minister of Labour20, “it is not for the courts to prescribe to the legislature about its 
preferred legitimate policy choices”.21 Challenges arising from the discretion of the Minister 
in extensions are a present and future reality in South Africa. The imposition of terms and 
conditions on all employers and employees in an industry, where there is lack of majority 
support for those terms and conditions, raises questions about the appropriateness of section 
32 (5) of the LRA . The FMF however did not proceed with their argument over the 
constitutionality of this section and it will be interesting to see how the courts will decide on 
the issue should it be raised again at a later stage.22 
 
1.3  Problem statement 
The constitutionality of section 32 of the LRA and the powers of the Minister of Labour to 
extend collective agreements have been studied and debated in recent years in South 
Africa.23For example, The Free Market Foundation (FMF) brought an attack against methods 
for extending bargaining council agreements.24 Initially, the FMF called for the removal of 
section 32(5) of the LRA stating that the provision is unconstitutional and in conflict with the 
constitution to the extent that it gives private actors (such as bargaining councils) the power 
to impose binding obligations on employees who are not members of the council.25 
 
This provision has been challenged in recent years because it is fraught with the 
discrepancies. This is evidenced by the problem with section 32(5) which is that the Minister 
may fail to meet all the statutory requirements for an extension.26 The Minister may also fail 
to come up with empirical evidence that tests the level of representation of the employer 
parties to the collective agreement that was sought to be extended.27In light of these 
problems, amongst others, this dissertation seeks to examine the constitutionality of section 
                                                          
20Free Market Foundation v Minister of Labour 2013 34 ILJ 1404 par 266. 
21FMF case para 114. 
22FMF (n18) para 121. 
23FMF (n18).                                                                                        
24 Bhorat (n18) above. 
25 FMF (n20). 
26 NEASA v Minister of Labour 2012 2 BLLR 198 (LC). 
27Valuline Cc v Minister of Labour 2013 34 ILJ 1404 (KZP). 
10 
 
32(5) of the LRA28 and explores whether there is substance in the argument submitted by the 
FMF. 
1.4 Objectives of this study 
This research will consider whether the provisions of section 32 are constitutional. In order to 
answer this question, the following aspects are addressed 
 Whether section 32(5) limits the constitutional right to fair labour practices 
including the right to engage in collective bargaining, to strike and to exercise the 
right to freedom of association. 
 
 Evaluation of the powers of the Minister of Labour  and the registrar of Labour 
Relations with regard to the extension of council bargaining agreements. In 
addition, whether or not the Ministerial discretion in the sector is an adequate 
safeguard, whether or not it constitutes unwarranted interference and less 
restrictive means for extensions are required. 
 
 The factors that are relevant in determining whether or not collective bargaining at 
sectoral level is compromised if a council bargaining agreement is not extended. 
 
 Whether a challenging the constitutionality of section 32(5) necessarily entails a 
challenge to the primary aims of the LRA. 
 
 The existing challenges arising from extensions of bargaining council agreements. 
 
 Recommendations aimed at addressing the challenges. 
 
 
1.5 Methodology 
This study is based on an analytical textbook study which explores an analysing textbooks, 
case law, legislation, relevant electronic sources and academic articles. The study’s approach 
will also be descriptive and comparative in so far as legal principles, international and foreign 
law such as Germany and Portugal is concerned. 
                                                          
28s32 (5) of the LRA. 
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1.6 Structure 
Chapter 1 sets out the framework of the study. It gives a background of the research, the aim 
of the study, the problem statement to be studied and the organisation of the study. 
Chapter 2 explains the concept of the extension of collective bargaining agreements in the 
South African context. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the challenges that arise because of the extension of bargaining council 
agreements. 
Chapter 4 dwells on ILO standards and analyses the extension of bargaining council 
agreements in jurisdictions that are comparable to South Africa. The jurisdictions examined, 
which include Portugal and Germany have been selected in light of their developed approach 
towards the extension of collective bargaining agreements. The South African Constitution of 
1996 favours an international law and comparative law -friendly approach in interpreting the 
rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights. 
Chapter 5 contains the conclusion and recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE PROCEDURE OF EXTENSION OF BARGAINING COUNCIL AGREEMENTS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The constitution is the principle source of labour relations law in South Africa.29In 1994 
South Africa became a democracy. This was followed by the promulgation of an interim 
Constitution with the final Constitution being adopted in 1996.The present constitution has 
constitutional supremacy.30 Supremacy necessitates that the judiciary holds the power to the 
test, any law or action against the constitution and may thus proclaim any laws or actions 
which are contrary to the Constitution as invalid.31The LRA was enacted to provide a 
structure in terms of which workers and employees can collectively bargain to determine 
wages, terms and conditions of employment and other matters of mutual interest. In South 
Africa, the extension of collective agreements is regulated through legislation. This chapter 
focuses on the constitutional and legislative principles that are relevant to the extension of 
collective agreements. 
2.2 Definition of bargaining councils 
A bargaining council is a body that is established by one or more employer’s organisations 
and one or more trade unions.32 In terms of the LRA, for a particular industry must be 
registered under the LRA.33 This means that there are limits to the kind of disputes bargaining 
                                                          
29see s23 of the constitution. 
30 Campelle “Constitutional or parliamentary Documentary in South Africa” 2006 Africa in Transition available 
at https://www.cfr.org.blog/constitutional-or-parliamentary-democracy-southafrica. (20-11-2018). 
31 s172 of the constitution. 
32 s27 (1) of the LRA. Also see Tshayana The role of bargaining councils in dispute resolution in the private 
sector (2003 dissertation SA) 1.  
33 s29 of the LRA. 
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councils may hear.34 Bargaining councils consist of representatives from the major unions 
and employer groups within each sector.35The LRA36 and the Basic Conditions Employment 
Act37 are the two pieces of legislation that regulate bargaining councils in South Africa. 
Section 27(1) of the LRA states that, “One or more registered trade unions and one or more 
registered employers organisations may establish a bargaining council for a sector and area 
by (a) adopting a constitution that meets the requirements of section 30 and (b) obtaining 
registration of the bargaining council in terms of section 29”. 
The aim of these councils is to provide a forum for collective bargaining in terms of which 
settlement on matters of mutual interest can be reached by means of negotiation.38 
  2.2.1 Powers and functions of bargaining councils (Section 28)39 
   These powers and functions are as follows:         
 making and enforcing collective agreements:-40 
 preventing and resolving labour disputes, and also establishing and managing 
a dispute resolution fund. 
 promoting and establishing training and education schemes; and 
 making and submitting proposals on policies and laws which have an effect on 
a specific area or sector. 
The primary functions of a bargaining council remain the by-laws of sectors of employment 
over which it has control through extension of collective agreements and settling of disputes. 
Generally, the main goal and purpose of a bargaining council is to uphold labour peace in the 
sector over which it has control through collective agreements set up in line with the 
conditions of employment.41 The council must also resolve disputes between employers and 
employees whenever they occur. The outcome of which must be to the satisfaction of both 
parties.42 
2.3 Definition of collective agreements 
                                                          
34Matete The role of bargaining councils in a collective bargaining framework in the garment industry: a lesson 
for Lesotho (2014 dissertation SA) 5. 
35 s27 of the LRA. 
36 s49 of the BCEA (n4). 
37 s49 of the BCEA (n35). 
38s172 of the constitution. 
39 s28 of the LRA. 
40s32 (5) of the LRA. 
41 Van Eck and Van Jaarsveld Principles of labour law (1998) 220. 
42 Van Eck and Van Jaarsveld Principles of labour law (1998)221. 
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For the purposes of this discussion, it is necessary to understand what a collective agreement 
is. Its definition may be found in section 213 of the LRA.43According to s213,collective 
agreements are defined as written agreements concerning terms and conditions of 
employment or others matters of mutual interest concluded between a registered trade union 
on the one hand,  and on the other hand, one or more employers, registered employers’ 
organisations or one or more employers and one or more employer’s 
organisations.44Although the agreement must be in writing, there is no requirement that it 
should be signed in order to be valid (unless so stipulated in the agreement).45 Section 23 
provides what the legal effect of collective agreements entails. It states that the agreement 
must expressly bind the employees before it is extended.46 
2.3.1 The binding effect of collective agreements 
In a scenario were collective agreements are to be regulated by common law contractual rules 
only, a number of legal rules would immediately frustrate their operation. For example, in a 
situation where a trade union concludes a collective agreement with an employer, is it 
authorised to contract as the legal agent of its members? If a trade union represents the vast 
majority of employees in a workplace, how does the employer ensure, other than by 
individual negotiation with non-members, that the same terms are applied to all employees? 
Section 23 of the LRA avoids the problems that would inevitably result if collective 
agreements were regulated by contractual rules.47 The section provides that a collective 
agreement binds: 
 the parties to the collective agreement48; 
 each party to the collective agreement and the members of every other party to the 
collective agreement, in so far as the provisions of the agreement are applicable 
between them;49 and 
 the members of a registered trade union and the employers who are members of a 
registered employers organisation that is party to the collective agreement if the 
agreement regulates: 
 terms and conditions of employment; or50 
                                                          
43 s13 of the LRA. 
44 s213 of LRA. 
45 s213 of LRA 66 of 1995. See also Diamond v Daimler Chrysler SA Pty Ltd 2006 27 ILJ 2595 (LC). 
46 s23 of the LRA. 
47s23 of the LRA. 
48s23 (1) of the LRA. 
49Mhlongo v FAWU and another2007 1 BLLR 141 (LC). 
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 the conduct of the employers in relation to their employees or, conversely the 
conduct of employees in relation to their employers.51 
 
 employers who are not members of the registered trade unions or unions that are party 
to the collective agreement if: 
 the employees are identified in the agreement:-52 
 the agreement expressly binds the employees:- and53 
 the trade union or unions that are party to the collective agreement have as 
their members the majority of employees employed by the employer in the 
workplace.54 
The phrase “terms and conditions of employment” refers only to express or implied terms of 
the employment contract (rather than to so-called ‘work practices’).55 The remainder of the 
subject matter of a collective agreement is, however, much broader in scope. The courts have 
consistently interpreted the concept ‘matters of mutual interest’ widely in order to include not 
only issues that directly concern the employer-employee relationship. A good example in this 
regard would be wages and health and safety at work, as well as issues that are generally of 
significance or of the interests to those parties.56 A collective agreement remains binding for 
the whole period of the agreement and on every person bound by the agreement who was, at 
the time the agreement became binding, a member of the union or employers organisation 
concerned, or who became a member after the agreement became binding whether or not that 
person continues to be a member of the trade union or employers’ organisation concerned for 
the duration of that period.57 The terms of the collective agreement may be extended to non-
members in terms of section 23(1) (d) provided that the members are expressly mentioned in 
the agreement and that the agreement expressly binds them.58 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
50 s23(c) (i) of the LRA. 
51 s23 (c) (ii) of the LRA. 
52  S23 (d) (i) of the LRA. 
53s23 (d) (ii) of the LRA. 
54s23 (1) (d) of the LRA. 
55A Mauchle (Pty) Ltd t/a Precision Tools v NUMSA 1995 4 BLLR 11 (LAC). 
56Rand Tyres and Accessories (Pty) Ltd v Industrial Council for the Motor Industry, Minister for Labour and 
Minister for Justice 1941 TPD 108 at 115. 
57 Vista University v Botha 1997 5 BLLR 614 (LC). 
58 s23 (1) (d) of the LRA. 
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A collective agreement varies any contract of employment between an employer and an 
employee who are both bound by a collective agreement.59 The variation takes place by 
operation of law, a provision that should be read with section 199 of the LRA.60 The section 
provides that a contract of employment, whether concluded before or after the 
commencement of a collective agreement, may not permit an employee to be paid less than 
the remuneration prescribed by that agreement or to be treated in any manner or granted any 
benefit that is less favourable than that prescribed by the collective agreement.61 A contract of 
employment may not waive the application of any provision of a collective agreement.62 Any 
provision in a contract of employment in breach of these provisions is invalid.63 If a 
collective agreement is concluded for an indefinite period, any party to the agreement may 
terminate the agreement by giving reasonable notice in writing to the other parties.64In the 
case of Imperial Cargo Solutions v Satawu the court concluded that the employees were 
entitled to cancel the collective agreement on notice.65 However, the obligation of the 
employer to pay the employee also ended. This also shows that, if there is no other agreement 
which compels the employees to keep performing their duties after the cancellation of a 
collective agreement they can be relieved off their duties. 
2.4 The constitutional framework with reference to the extension of collective bargaining 
agreements 
 Section 23(1) of the bill of rights provides that “everyone” has the right to fair labour 
practices.66 The rest of the provisions in that section mentions workers, employers, trade 
unions and employer organisations. This is contrary to the popular belief that only employees 
are vulnerable and in need of protection. Sections 23(2) and (3) of the constitution provides 
that workers and employers’ have the rights to form and join trade unions or employers’ 
organisations as well as  participate in the activities and programmes of those organisations. 
These provisions seek to avoid the exploitation of workers which was a common feature of 
life in South Africa during the apartheid years. In addition, section 23 (2) (c) provides 
workers the right to strike. Section 23(4) entrenches the rights of trade unions and employers’ 
                                                          
59 s23(c) of the LRA 66 of 1995. 
60 LRA 66 of 1995. 
61SACCAWU v Garden Route Chalets Pty Ltd 1997 3 BLLR 325 (CCMA). 
62 s213 of the LRA. 
63 s213 of the LRA. 
64s23 (4) of the LRA. 
65 JA63/2016 (LAC) 
66 s23(1) of the LRA. 
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organisations to regulate their own administrative programmes and activities, as well as to 
organise and to form and join 67a federation.  
Section 23(5) of the constitution provides that, “every trade union, employer’s organisation 
and employer has the right to engage in collective bargaining. National legislation may be 
enacted to regulate collective bargaining. To the extent that legislation may limit a right in 
this chapter, the limitation must comply with section 36(1).”Section 23(5) of the constitution 
bears a pivotal part of the basis of this study. Extension of council agreements is introduced 
by national legislation which regulates collective bargaining. Extensions have an effect on the 
right of non-parties to participate in collective bargaining.68 Section 23(6) of the constitution 
stipulates that national legislation may acknowledge union security arrangements contained 
in collective agreements69.Any limitation must be in accordance with section 36(1) of the 
constitution.70 Section 36, the general limitation clause, stipulates that all rights in the bill of 
rights must be limited in terms of a law of general application and that any limitation must be 
reasonable and justifiable. Section 36 may, therefore be used to limit the right to collective 
bargaining if the reasons are reasonable and justifiable. The requirement of reasonableness 
and justifiability are determined by looking at the five factors in section 36(1) of the 
constitution. These requirements are the nature of the right, the importance of the purpose of 
the limitation, the relation between the limitation and its purpose, and whether there are less 
restrictive means to achieve this purpose.71 
On face value, section 23 does not seem to provide a constitutional duty to bargain. The 
constitutional court gives clarity on this matter; there is no duty to bargain in South Africa.  
O’Regan J in SANDU v Minister of Defences 72  stated as follows, “were section 23(5) to 
establish a justifiable duty to bargain, enforceable by either employers or unions outside of a 
legislative framework to regulate that duty courts may be drawn into a range of controversial 
industrial relations issues”.73The constitution, in section 23, does not give clarity as to the 
level at which collective bargaining is supposed to take place.74 This, however, should be 
                                                          
 
68 Vettori and Brown “The extension of collective agreements to non-parties “African Journal of Hospitality, 
Tourism and Leisure   2014 1 http//:www.ajhtl.com (17-09-18). 
69 For example, a closed shop agreement or agency shop agreement. 
70 The constitution. 
71 S36 of the constitution. 
72 2007 9 BLLR 785 (CC). 
73SANDU v Minister of Defence 2007 9 BLLR 785 (CC). 
74Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law: A comprehensive Guide (2015) 325. 
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regulated by other legislation and not the constitution.75 It is noteworthy that the promotion of 
collective bargaining at sectoral level is not clearly addressed in the constitution   is found in 
the LRA. 76 
 Du Toit considers the argument that was proffered by employers at the ILO that there is no 
right to strike on international level.77He makes reference a recent decision of the Canadian 
Supreme Court which analysed the right to strike.78 A very similar question was recently 
considered by the Canadian Supreme Court in Saskatchewan Federation of Labour 
Saskatchewan79 where the constitutionality of provincial legislation limiting the right to strike 
was the main issue… In a majority decision, the Canadian Supreme Court ruled that, “the 
right to strike, because there is no explicit right, was not merely derivative of collective 
bargaining; it is an indispensable component of that right”.80 In this case, it was held that the 
right to strike is important in achieving values and goals through a collective bargaining 
process because it allows workers to take away their labour when collective bargaining 
reaches a stalemate. Through strike action workers unite and participate in the process of 
determining their wages, working conditions and the rules that will administrate their 
working lives. The capacity to strike, therefore, permits workers, through collective action, to 
refuse to work under certain terms and conditions.  The ability to engage in collective action 
after a deadlock is reached underscores the dignity and autonomy of employees in their 
working lives.81 
According to Van Niekerk and Smit, freedom of association is at the heart of the concept of 
collective bargaining.82 Freedom of association is a “precondition for the realisation of a 
number of different rights, including the right to organise, to engage in collective bargaining 
and to strike.83In a situation where terms and conditions are decided and agreed upon in a 
bargaining council and extended to non-parties, it seems likely that this would infringe the 
rights of non-parties to engage in collective bargaining. It is submitted that this is because the 
non-parties have the conditions discussed imposed upon them as they do not get an 
                                                          
75s 23(5) of the Constitution. 
76 s1 of the  LRA. 
77Du Toit ‘collective bargaining’ or ‘collective begging’ 2015 Available at 
http://www.mylexisnexis.co.za/Index.aspx (3-09-18). 
78Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan 2015 I SCR 245 (CAN LII). 
79 2015 SCC 4 
80Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan   (n75) 3. 
81Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan  (n75) 4. 
82Niekerk and Smit Law (n14) 433. 
83s18 of the constitution. 
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opportunity to present their own suggestions and opinions. In Kem-Lin Fashions CC, Zondo 
JP gave an explanation that the will of the majority would prevail over that of the minority 
and if it was the other way round and the minority were the ones dictating to the majority, 
this would be untenable. He also remarked that this was “good for orderly collective 
bargaining”.84 If a trade union that is not a party to the collective agreement finds itself bound 
by its conditions and there is a “peace-clause” in the agreement, the trade union which gets 
the agreement imposed on it may be prevented from striking in terms of section 65 85.They 
will be prohibited from striking over any matter discussed in the collective agreement. This, it 
would appear, is a limitation to the right to strike86. 
 
2.5 Legislative provisions of extension of council bargaining agreements  
Section 27 states that one or more registered trade unions and one or more registered 
employers’ organisations may establish a bargaining council for a sector and area by adopting 
a Constitution that meets the requirements of section 30.87Section 28 dwells on the powers of 
the bargaining council which have been discussed above at 2.2.1.88It must also obtain 
registration of the bargaining council in terms of section 29.89 Section 29 stipulates the 
requirements for the registration of a bargaining council. Section 31 of the LRA regulates the 
binding nature of collective agreement that is concluded in bargaining councils.90 Section 32 
is no different from section 23 but takes into account the structure of a bargaining council and 
the identity of the bargaining parties. Collective bargaining is conducted between one or more 
employer’s organisations or trade unions. Individual employers are not able to be members of 
bargaining councils. Section 31 states that a council agreement concluded in a bargaining 
council are binding on the parties to the agreement.91The council agreement is therefore, 
binding on the parties to the agreement to the extent that the agreement dwells on the 
relationship between them.92 The collective agreement is also binding on members of parties 
to the agreement, in the event of registered trade unions, on the one hand, and registered 
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employers’ organisations, on the other hand if the agreement regulates to terms and 
conditions of employment or by the treatment of the employees by their employers.93  
A typical bargaining council agreement regulates inter alia, minimum wages, maximum 
hours of work, maximum overtime, sick leave, annual leave, public holidays, bonuses and 
overtime rates.94 These may also include close shop and agency agreements95. Section 32 (1) 
provides that a bargaining council may request the minister to extend a council agreement 
that has been concluded in the bargaining council to non-parties  that are within the council’s 
registered scope and are mentioned in the request. Such an extension has the effect of making 
the non-party a party to the agreement.96 
The minister should ensure that the council complies with the requirements of section 32.97 If 
the requirements have been met, the agreement can then be extended. The discretion not to 
extend an agreement must be exercised. The discretion not to extend an agreement which 
applies when the numbers of representatives stipulated by the LRA, have not been met.98 The 
minister must also be convinced that refusal to extend the agreement will have an adverse 
effect on collective bargaining in the sector.99 The minister should also invite comments 
before extending the agreement.100 It is submitted that the powers of the minister should be 
re-evaluated. This is because the minister’s discretionary powers may be open to abuse. An 
example is the case of Valuline CC v Minister of Labour where the Minister failed to rely on 
empirical evidence to test the level of representativity of the employer parties to a collective 
agreement. It is submitted that such an error in judgement making minister negatively affects 
the validity of the extension. 
Two thresholds need to be met before a bargaining council agreement can be extended to 
non-parties.  The first relates to the representatives of the parties who vote in favour of a 
request to the minister to extend the agreements. The second relates to the representatives of 
the parties to the council in relation to the range of the extended agreement.101 The first 
threshold requires that, at a meeting of the bargaining council, one or more registered trade 
unions where members are the majority of the members of the trade unions that are party to 
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the bargains council vote in favour of the extension102. It further requires that one or more 
registered employers’ organisations, whose members employ the majority of the employees 
employed by the members of the employer’s organisations that are party to the bargaining 
council, vote in favour of the extension.103 
The second threshold requires the minister to be satisfied that the requirements of section 
32(3)104  have been complied with. The requirements are that the decision of the bargaining 
council to request the extension of the collective agreement should be in compliance with the 
provisions of section 32(1)105. The majority of the employees who, upon extension of the 
council agreement, will fall within the scope of the agreement must be members of the trade 
unions that are parties to the bargaining council.106 Members of the employers ‘organisations 
that are parties to the bargaining council must, upon the extension of the council agreement, 
ensure that the majority of those who fall within the scope of the council agreement are their 
employees. 107 
The non-parties specified in the request must fall within the scope of the bargaining councils 
terms of registration108 The council agreement should provide for an independent body to 
hear and decide within 30 days, any appeal that is brought against the bargaining councils for 
refusing of a non-party’s application. It must also have a provision for exemption from the 
provisions of a council agreement. The independent body also considers the withdrawal of an 
exemption by the bargaining council.109 The agreement should clearly spell out the standard 
to be used by the independent body when it considers an appeal.110 These standards should be 
fair and must uphold the primary objects of the Act111 which include the facilitation and 
promotion of collective bargaining at the workplace and sectoral level. The terms of the 
council agreement should not discriminate against non-parties.112 
If the above requirements have been met, the minister must extend the council agreement 
within 60 days of receiving the request by publishing a notice in the Government Gazette 
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announcing that from a specified date and for a specified period, the agreement will be 
binding on the non-parties identified in the notice.113 If the provisions regarding the 
representivity of the trade unions and employers’ organisations have not been met, the 
minister may still extend the collective agreement if the parties to the bargaining council are 
adequately representative in line with the terms of the registration of the bargaining council in 
respect of which the extension is required.114 The collective agreement may also be extended 
if the minister is content that a failure to extend the agreement may compromise collective 
bargaining at sectoral level or in the public service as a whole.115It is submitted that there is a 
lot of uncertainty in the validity of the ministerial extensions. This maybe illustrated by the 
case of NEASA v Minister of Labour where the minister failed to meet all the statutory 
requirements needed for an extension.116It is submitted that the powers of the Minister should 
be re-evaluated so as to try to avoid such incidents. They could also be a provision which 
allows the Minister to hear a second opinion from someone else like a subordinate for 
instance with regard to whether all the requirements have been met. 
It is, therefore, argued that the notion of democracy is disregarded when evaluating section 
32. There is no definition of democracy in the constitution but there are different forms of 
democracy which are direct, representative, pluralist and participatory.117Roux states that, 
“democracy cannot be merely equated with the majority-rule principle, but rather means 
something deeper which entails the recognition of individual rights. The protection of 
fundamental rights is a condition necessary for a process to be democratic”.118 
It is therefore submitted that, section 32 (5) of the LRA infringes on the principles of 
democracy to the extent that, although it recognises the majority-rule principle, it does little 
to acknowledge individual rights. In the case of Democratic Alliance v Masondo, Sachs J 
made some important comments which are valid when taking into account the principle of 
democracy, which is upheld by the constitution.119 Sachs stated that fair representation does 
not entail a mathematical form of democracy but, rather envisages a “pluralist democracy” 
where there is respect for “the rights of all to be heard and have their view considered.”120 It 
is submitted that even though these remarks were made with regard to local government, the 
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same principles of democracy should also be considered when extending collective 
agreements. It is submitted that when extension of collective agreements are done, “the rights 
of all to be heard and their view considered” is not currently taken into consideration. 
Sections 32 and 49 of the Labour Relations Act were amended in January 2019. The changes 
made are that it is no longer a requirement for both a union and employers organisation to 
hold a majority. Only one of the two is now required to hold a majority. The notice period in 
section 32 (2) has been extended from 60 days to 90 days.121It is submitted that the extension 
from 30 days to 60 days was made so as to prolong the period of time before an extension 
becomes binding on the non-parties. This gives the minister ample time to make sure that all 
the requirements have been met.122 If a funding agreement expires or there is failure to reach 
an agreement 90 days before expiry, an application must be made to the minister to extend 
for 12 months where it may undermine collective bargaining. The registrar of Labour 
Relations will now be determining level of representation valid for two years and not every 
time a request for extension is submitted. One submits that this change may have been made 
to create uniformity.123 
2.6 Conclusion  
 In conclusion, it can be argued that section 32(5) permits the will of some to be imposed on 
others. Of concern in this regard is that those who are unfortunate enough to have collective 
agreements imposed on them are not being adequately respected or protected and neither are 
they being protected. Democracy does not, therefore, always entail majority-rule. It is ones’ 
humble submission that the rights of all the parties involved should be taken into account in 
the decision-making process  and the final decision should at least be supported the majority 
of those concerned before being imposed on those who do  not necessarily agree with the 
decision. Furthermore, the discretionary powers of the minister should be re-evaluated as 
there are a number of cases cited in this chapter show that the minister made errors which 
resulted in the extensions being rendered invalid. In some cases such errors could have 
unintended consequences. When taking into account section 32 of the LRA and the extension 
of collective agreements, there is little possibility that the courts will ever confirm existence 
of a constitutional obligation to bargain. This renders the collective bargaining framework as 
voluntary. No person or organisation is compelled to be part of a bargaining council. In fact 
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those who are proponents of the concept of a free market insist that employers and employees 
should be left to voluntarily negotiate wages amongst themselves. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
CHALLENGES RESULTING FROM THE EXTENSION OF BARGAINING 
COUNCIL AGREEMENTS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
It is important to ensure that there is uniformity in every industry or sector. This can be done 
by establishing and ensuring certain minimum terms and conditions of employment that are 
applicable to all employers and employees in the relevant industry. What is stipulated in the 
Minimum Wage Act should also be enforced.124 This is essential as it ensures a level 
playfield in so far as orderly sectoral collective bargaining. 125While extension of council 
bargaining agreements is meant to achieve this, this procedure also has its challenges.126 This 
chapter analyses the challenges arise from the extension of bargaining council agreements 
and suggestions on how to deal with some of the problems are proffered. 
 
3.2 Controversy associated with the extension of bargaining council agreements 
3.2.1 The imposition of choices made by parties to the bargaining council upon non- parties   
One of the challenges is that, this “process binds non-parties to conditions that they have not 
had a role in negotiating”127Centralised bargaining has a greater impact on the labour market 
while enterprise level bargaining has a lesser effect. This is because the bargaining unit is 
smaller, and the dialogue is specific to that enterprise.128 Because non-parties were not part of 
the negotiations, their capacity to pay is not taken into consideration. According to 
Godfrey,129 in theory the test should be the capacity to pay of the least profitable party. It can 
be argued, however, that there is neither evidence nor empirical study that show that 
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extension of collective agreements results in insolvency or unemployment. Every sector and 
bargaining council is unique in its own way and large firms are not “immune” to financial 
troubles. Although slightly less than 5% of South African employees are covered by extended 
agreements, concluded by bargaining councils, the latter should still secure the buy-in of the 
majority.130 
 
3.2.2 Job losses resulting in a higher rate of unemployment rate and increased wages 
Extension of collective agreements has been criticised for being the catalyst of job losses and 
unemployment as well as their perceived adverse effect on small businesses.131 While, some 
non-party employers may be able to pay the increased wages as agreed in the bargaining 
councils in the quest to implement the terms of the collective agreement, others may be 
forced to reduce the number of employees so that they are able to raise the wages of the 
remaining workers.132 Some economists have credited the failure of the market to maintain 
equilibrium to over-regulation.133According to Vettori, unemployment is affected by the 
extension of collective agreements and wages that are much higher than what the market 
would otherwise permit, which is the so called “market clearing wage”.134 They are of the 
opinion that this results in unemployed people being discriminated against.135 Brassey holds 
the view that “workers are no longer the least advantaged class…now it is the jobless who 
make up this class” Consequently the unemployed end up offering their services at a lower 
price.136 Calitz takes into consideration the impact that wage discussions in bargaining 
councils have on the issue of wages. She examines  the discoveries of Van der Weisthuizen 
and concludes that  wages are raised significantly in sectors, where  bargaining councils exist, 
of which those sectors have lower levels of employment in small businesses.137 Bhorat holds 
the opinion that workers who were part of bargaining councils in the year 2005 enjoyed a 
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“wage premia”.138While raising wages constitutes a benefit for employees, it does not offer a 
long-term benefit if the increase in wages result in unemployment and retrenchments.139 
Godfrey on the other hand, is of the view that extension of bargaining council agreements has 
had insignificant effect on the levels of unemployment.140 This view is premised on the very 
small percentage of employers and employees who are under bargaining councils or 
collective agreements. He makes reference to statistics which were published by Statistics 
South Africa some years ago which indicate that the percentage of employees parties we 
bargaining councils was 32.6 % and the number of employees who are under collective 
agreements is slightly below 5 % in South Africa. Those who defend the extension of council 
bargaining agreements rely on these statistics to buttress their argument that the 
condemnation of the impact of extensions is grossly overstated.141 Efforts to collect statistical 
data on bargaining council coverage is compromised by the fact that a number of non-party 
employers deliberately do not register themselves and their employees with the bargaining 
council and some do this intentionally.142 According to Godfrey, 30% of the bargaining 
councils agents’ time is spent on trying to track down unregistered firms.143 Anstey assumes 
that this may be one of the reasons for including the ministerial discretion in section 32(5), a 
provision he refers as a “backdoor”.144One is persuaded to suggest that, in order to curtail the 
problem of bargaining councils deliberately not registering themselves, a penalty should be 
introduced for defaulters. This writer agrees with Godfrey when he argues that the percentage 
of employees and employers who are under bargaining councils is so small to give a major 
effect on unemployment bargaining councils is too small to have a significant impact on 
unemployment. 
 
3.2.3 Impact on smaller firms 
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The impact of extensions on small businesses has rendered the procedure susceptible to 
severe criticise.145 According to Goldberg  a number of crises that are common among small 
firms such as “inability to raise capital and the high cost of it, the lack of purchasing power, 
shortage of entrepreneurial and managerial skills, low administrative capability and the 
inability to offer professional services”146 This may, however be seen as an over 
generalisation as there are some small businesses that boast of skills, impressive levels of 
professionalism, market strength and  very healthy  good profit margins.147  One cannot, 
however, ignore the potential negative effect that extended collective agreements can have on 
small firms and non-parties in the form of high wages and job losses in general. 
There is a protracted debate about the notion that companies that are members of employers’ 
organisations which are parties to the bargaining councils are mostly large firms. 148The 
average size of firms that are members of bargaining councils consists of twenty-seven (27) 
employees while non-party employers have an average of eleven employees.149 Godfrey 
queries why small firms have an issue with the bargaining council procedures and seem to 
hold the assumption that the difficulty lies in the voting that plays out within the employers’ 
organisations. Small firms feel they are more flexible and therefore able to follow whatever 
“route” is taken by employers of larger firms. According to the small firms, this is because 
they do not have the proficiency and sophistication that the bigger firms possess.150This 
renders the smaller firms incapable of implementing or influencing the arguments that are 
articulated have by representatives of larger firms.151 Another reason for the failure of small 
firms to play an active role is associated with each individuals’ input, thereby placing more 
demand on management and those in charge of the human resource department in small 
firms.152 It is argued that this is probably true to some extent because small firms generally 
have little resources when compared to bigger firms. They do not have much options with 
regard to the utilisation of their resources. 
 
3.2.4 Conflicting Interests 
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According to Calitz, the “one size fits all” concept does not apply, implying that employers 
and employees in an industry do not necessarily have the same interests.153It can be argued 
that this statement is valid because it is impossible for all employers and employees to share 
the same interests or views. Employees interests may contrast depending on the sub-sector 
and the kind of work which the employees engage in.154 The same is the situation with regard 
to parties to a bargaining council which represent and bargain for the specific requirements of 
their members.155 In light of this, when collective bargaining occurs at a central or sectoral 
level, agreements must, where  possible be wide and form  a general  framework as opposed 
to stipulating in great detail the actual terms and conditions as well as wages. If an agreement 
is too narrow, it leaves no room for employers to discuss and agree with employees’ terms 
which are enterprise-specific.156 This should at least be taken into consideration where there 
is an intention by the parties to extend to non-parties a collective agreement concluded in the 
bargaining council. According to Cheadle, “the failure to understand the regulatory functions 
of the bargaining council agreement has led to parties agreeing to actual terms and conditions 
and accordingly setting no framework for variation at the level of the enterprise or workplace 
to accommodate differences between employers.”157This view makes sense because a lack of 
understanding of the purpose of a bargaining council ultimately results in it failing to cater 
for the differences between the employers. It is, therefore, submitted that the parties should 
first make sure that they understand what the functions of the council are and discuss how to 
meet the interests of all the employers. It is further submitted that it should be mandatory for 
all parties to undergo a session whereby the functions of the bargaining council are explained 
before deciding on terms and conditions. 
 
 
3.3 Other proposals for reform 
According to Anstey, ensuring compliance with the terms discussed in the bargaining council 
is an enormous task when the ability to comply is inadequate. Thus, more “willing 
compliance” by employers is vital”. “Willing compliance more likely be attained if the deal 
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entered by the parties to the bargaining council is supported by at least half of the employers 
and employees in that industry.158 In the FMF judgement Murphy J held that the numbers 
required by section 32(3) of the LRA are likely to be difficult to put into practice. Therefore, 
in order to rise above this difficulty, section 32(5) should be resorted to as an option.159 It is, 
thus, submitted that there are other factors which can be put into consideration when the 
required numbers of employees is not reached they can be complemented by other factors. 
These factors are employees’ assigned temporary employment services, employees employed 
on fixed-term contracts, part-time employees or employees in other categories.160 
 
3.2 The constitutionality of S32(5) of the LRA 
The extension procedure of implementing an extension appears to constrain non-parties from 
engaging in collective bargaining at sectoral level. An example is a scenario where a trade 
union and an employers’ organisation, who have not signed the agreement, engage in 
separate discussions and come up with their own collective agreement. The fact that they may 
or may not be more representatives than the other party to the other collective agreement is a 
different matter altogether. Extending a single collective agreement to cover a whole 
industry, however, has the effect of superseding any other agreements reached by other 
parties in the industry.161 
When it comes to the right to strike, many collective agreements have a “peace clause” 
whereby the parties subject to the agreement (including  non-parties to whom the agreement 
is extended) are not allowed to resort to industrial action on issues of mutual interest during 
the prevalence of that agreement.162 This gives the employers a respite of industrial peace 
during that period. Limiting the issues with regard to which employees may strike limits the 
right to strike. Without the ability to strike, the bargaining power of a trade union is severely 
compromised.163In addition, this limits the non-parties right to engage in collective 
bargaining as well.164 
3.5 Limitation of the right to engage in collective bargaining 
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Section 36 of the constitution entails that, if there is a limitation of one of the rights as 
enshrined in the bill of rights, an enquiry should be concluded on whether the limitation is 
“reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on dignity, equality and 
freedom.”165 Extension of collective agreements serves the purpose of promoting collective 
bargaining at sectoral level as well as promoting orderly collective bargaining. While parties 
have the right to engage in collective bargaining, there is no constitutional right to bargaining 
at enterprise level. Sectoral level bargaining holds its own challenges while bargaining gives 
some benefits for the bargaining partners166 However, the legislature is authorised to make 
such policy choices an section 23(5) of the  promotes such regulation of collective 
bargaining. It says, “Every trade union, employer’s organisation and employer has the right to 
engage in collective bargaining. National legislation may be enacted to regulate collective 
bargaining. To the extent that the legislation may limit a right in this chapter, the limitation 
must comply with section 36(1) of the Constitution167. According to Roux, “the justifiability 
on the right to engage in collective bargaining depends very much on the justifications for 
sector level bargaining and the necessity of the extension mechanism for securing the 
integrity of sector level collective bargaining or its alternative (collective action). The right is 
also not completely revoked, no bar is placed on joining the parties to the bargaining council 
and participating in collective bargaining.” 168  
It is submitted that Roux’s view could be reasonable to some extent because there is a 
provision for exemptions. It can be argued, however, that the limitations are not justifiable in 
terms of section 36.169There are other less restrictive ways such as extending collective 
agreements by only allowing only extensions in terms of section 32 which are consistent with 
democratic values. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
In conclusion, it is submitted that the extension of bargaining council agreements infringes on 
fair labour practices and the rights to strike and collective bargaining. It is, therefore, 
suggested that if section 32(5) of the LRA is discarded, then section 32 will be consistent 
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with the constitution. Section 32(3) of the LRA will be more in sync with the values of the 
constitution. This would enhance the chances of the procedure of extensions achieving the 
goals for which it was intended. It might also put to rest, criticism of the procedure of 
extensions which has lingered for years. The shift in policy in relation to the discretionary 
powers of the Minister to extend collective agreements to non-parties was at the heart of the 
FMF’s constitutional challenge. As noted earlier, the FMF initially mounted a wide ranging 
attack on section 32 of the LRA in the form of a Bill of Rights review on various grounds. It 
later jettisoned most of these and relied solely on the principle of legality. It is also submitted 
that the suggestion that was made by the FMF, that in section 32 (2) the word “must” should 
be replaced with the word “may” should be taken on board. The word “may “allows the 
minister to exceed the 60 day period before extending the agreement and gives him or her 
ample time to make sure that all the requirements have been  met.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS AND EXTENSION OF BARGAINING 
COUNCIL AGREEMENTS IN COMPARATIVE FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The South African Constitution takes into account foreign and international law.170 In the 
case of S v Makwanyane171 the court stated that public international law comprises of binding 
and non-binding laws. A tribunal, forum or court may take into consideration foreign law 
when interpreting the bill of rights.172 Section 39 (1) further imposes that the ILO bodies must 
consider international law and may consider foreign law173 Section 233 stipulates that, when 
interpreting any legislation, every court must regard any reasonable interpretation of the 
legislation that complies with international law.174 This chapter focuses on international 
standards and the recommendations made by the International Labour Organisation in trying 
to resolve the challenges of extension of council bargaining agreements while also 
considering how other countries regulate the extension of council bargaining agreements. It 
also considers how other countries regulate the extension of council bargaining agreements. 
This submission specifically looks at Germany and Portugal because the legal systems of the 
two countries recently underwent developments and reviews regarding the extension of 
collective agreements. 
 
4.2 International Labour Organization (ILO) standards 
The preamble of the constitution of the ILO “declares recognition of the principle of freedom 
of association as a means of improving conditions of labour and establishing peace”. 
Convention 87 gives effect to this aspiration.175Article 2 of the Convention comprises of a 
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number of rights that uphold the right to freedom to association and the freedom to 
organise.176 The right to freedom of association is found in section 18 of the constitution.177 
In this Convention the term organisation means any organisation of workers or employers for 
furthering and defending the interests of workers or of employers.178Convention 98 contains 
provisions which are relevant to this study.179 Article 4 of this Convention necessitates the 
enactment of legislation that facilitates voluntary collective bargaining. It obliges member 
states to encourage collective bargaining in their respective countries whenever it is 
appropriate.180 As highlighted in a previous chapter of this study, South Africa does not seem 
to have a constitutional duty to bargain, but rather voluntarily bargaining. Clause 5(1) of the 
Collective Agreements Recommendation 91of 1951 states that, where it is appropriate, and 
taking into consideration the system and conditions of each country, measures should be 
taken to extend particular parts of collective agreements to employers and employees in a 
given industry. 181This principle is not cast in stone but varies from country to country 
depending on what measures are deemed appropriate in a particular country. Thus, it is 
impractical to compare different nation’s policies on extensions although valuable lessons 
can still be drawn from their experiences. 
Clause 5 (2) of the Recommendation contains an ambiguous precondition for extensions. It 
says that the collective agreement must include employers and workers who, in the view of 
the expert authority, are equally represented. The wording in section 32(5) seems to have 
been taken from clause 5(2) of Recommendation 91.182 Unfortunately, the recommendation is 
silent on what standards should be used to measure or to define “competent authority” and 
“sufficiently representative”. It also does not give a guide as to when extensions may be 
suitable. It is, therefore, up to the member states to include these provisions in either national 
legislation or regulations. 
The constitution and the conventions 87 and 98 are silent as to which level collective 
bargaining is most applicable.183 One of the purposes of the LRA is the promotion of 
collective bargaining at sectoral level.184 Section 32(5) of the Act requires that the Minister is 
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satisfied that the failure to extend a collective agreement may undermine collective 
bargaining at sectoral level.185 The standards of the ILO referred to above do not give much 
assistance with regards to the promotion of collective bargaining, what compromises 
collective bargaining and at which level collective bargaining should be promoted. 
Article 5 (1) of the Collective Bargaining Convention (Convention 154) necessitates that 
measures to be created which are appropriate to national settings in order to promote 
collective bargaining.186. Article 5 (2) specifies what the goals for such measures should be. It 
is submitted that the only aim that gives guidance is the following, collective bargaining 
should be made possible for all employers and all groups of workers in the branches of 
activity covered by this Convention”. The rest of the goals can be summed up as giving 
advice on the setting up of a framework that supports collective bargaining.187 Article 5(2) 
seems to be against the limiting the right of non-party employers and workers to participate in 
collective bargaining. There is nothing in the provision which suggests the necessity that the 
extension of   including a whole industry for the promotion of collective bargaining, nor is 
there anything which stipulates at which level bargaining must transpire in order for 
collective bargaining to be supported. The LRA articulates more specific requirements than 
Convention 154.This is because the LRA clearly spells out that failing to extent collective 
agreements can compromise collective bargaining and it advocates for the promotion of 
sectoral level bargaining.188 
The Collective Bargaining Recommendation of 1981 proffers suggestions on how collective 
bargaining in terms of Article 4 of Convention 98189. The suggestions include enabling the 
voluntary formation and growth of free independent and representative employer 
organisations. Convention 98 also seeks to promote collective bargaining190. From the 
foregoing it can be surmised that, in order to uphold collective bargaining, it is essential that 
the organisations are representative and their representive nature can be measured. This is 
important because dismissing questions of representation would possibly compromise the 
letter and spirit of collective bargaining.191 
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4.3 ILO views and recommendations 
The committee of experts is responsible for assessing reports submitted by member states and 
make non-binding findings which are then presented to the ILO Conference.192 In 1994, the 
committee of experts made an observation with reference to Article 4 of Convention 98. The 
committee observed that there should be procedures which enable bargaining between two 
sides of an industry, granting them the latitude to reach their own settlement.193 The 
Committee was also of the view that, even though public authorities were to establish 
procedures to collectively bargain and to consider of social and economic policy 
considerations in the public interest, the discretionary power of the authorities to authorise 
collective agreements is inconsistent with the principle of voluntary bargaining.194 
Article 4 states that measures should be put in place which enable voluntary negotiations 
between the bargaining parties.195 While there is the duty of states to encourage collective 
bargaining, the committee of experts does not give more guidance than Recommendation 163 
and Convention 154 as to how this should be done in practice. It is argued that the General 
Survey of 1994 gives the impression that there should be as little meddling, as possible by the 
relevant authorities during the conclusion of the settlement that are concluded by the 
bargaining parties. It also hints that public authorities may place specific obligations on the 
bargaining partners such as negotiating in the public interest, as well as social and economic 
considerations.  
In the General Survey of 2012, the Committee of Experts stated that, “the Committee 
considers that the extension of collective agreements is not contrary to the principle of 
voluntary collective bargaining and is not in violation of Convention No 98. The survey 
observes that such measures are envisaged in several countries.”196 It further clarifies what 
promotion of collective bargaining entails which, in essence, is the encouragement of 
bargaining in good faith and refraining from abusive or unfair practices. In the same survey 
of 2012, the committee of experts noted that that the promotion of collective bargaining 
entails the implementation of measures that “address improper practices in collective 
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bargaining, such as proven bad faith, unwarranted delays…and failure to comply with the 
agreements concluded.”197 Again, no mention is made of the effect that extension of 
collective agreements is a prerequisite for the promotion of collective bargaining. As 
indicated in a previous chapter, the South African Constitution does not make bargaining 
mandatory. Making it mandatory could, in fact, be one way of promoting collective 
bargaining. 
The committee of experts pinpointed two tendencies which demonstrate a lack of respect for 
the need to encourage collective bargaining. These are the preference given to individual 
rights over collective rights, as well as employers communicating more regularly with non-
unionised workers than with those that are represented.198 This, however, only seems to apply 
to enterprise level bargaining. The lack of ensuring applicability of collective agreements at 
any level is not stated. It can be argued that there is nothing in the General Surveys that 
restricts an extension of a collective agreement to non-parties where the parties to the 
collective agreement are only scantily represented. There is also no clear explanation of the 
meaning of what is “sufficiently representative”. With regard to the right to strike, Cooper 
makes reference the committee of expert’s discoveries in the General Survey of 1994. The 
findings betray the committee’s tolerance for the limitation of the right to strike during the 
subsistence of a collective agreement which it refers to as a social peace treaty, as long as the 
workers still have a remedy to “impartial and rapid arbitration machinery” insofar as the 
interpretation or application is concerned.199 Cooper concludes that the LRA is consistent 
with this view of the committee of experts. She, however, places doubt on the 
constitutionality of the limitation of the right to strike where an extension is made and non-
parties are prevented from striking because of a peace clause. 200 
  4.4 Countries (Germany and Portugal) which have made recent developments in the 
extension of bargaining agreements 
4.4.1 Germany 
In Germany, the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs is responsible for the extension of 
collective bargaining agreements201 provided certain conditions are met. Parties to the 
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agreement must apply for the extension. Another consideration is that the extension should be 
in the public interest. In addition, two-thirds of the six committee members that decide on the 
extension must be in favour of the extension. This means four out of a six member committee 
of three trade unionists and three employers’ representatives.202 The employer parties who 
sign the collective agreement are required to employ at least 50% of the workers in the sector 
which the agreement covers. As from 1999, the German Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs as opposed to the committee is authorised to affirm that conditions of employment 
that are binding in general.203 
Collective bargaining usually takes place at sectoral level.204 Since the 1980’s there has been 
decentralisation from sectoral to enterprise level bargaining. 205This has affected working 
hours and work councils have been able to influence some modifications to sectoral 
agreements.206So far, there has only been average use of the German extension 
mechanisms.207 Of the almost 63 000 collective agreements that were registered with the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs in 2012, only 640 were extended.208 During the period 
2013-2016 there was a significant decline in the extension of collective agreements.209 
In the year 2014, the Act on the Promotion of Collective Bargaining Autonomy was 
enacted.210 Its purpose is to promote collective bargaining and regulate the state’s position in 
wage issues.211 The Act consists of processes which make the extension of sectoral wage 
agreements that are possible. It also removes the requirement which stipulates that an 
agreement must cover more than half of the employees in the particular sector. The only prior 
condition for the extension is that it should be consistent with the public’s interest while the 
agreement should also be of paramount importance.212 It is submitted that it remains to be 
seen if removing the requirement that the agreement should cover half of the employees, will 
help in the increasing of the number of collective agreements. This is, however a positive 
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development, which shows that there is willingness to use more adaptable measures with the 
expectation that there will an increase in the number of extensions. 
 
4.4.2 Portugal 
In the past, the extension of collective agreements was standard practice in Portugal, while 
collective bargaining also occurred at sectoral level.213 The country’s Ministry of Economy 
and Employment can extend an agreement while collective agreements will be published in 
its official news broadcast. 214Thereafter, the agreement becomes legally binding and 
signatories to the collective agreement can request decrees to be issued by the ministry.215 In 
the past there were no pre-conditions for extensions and the Ministry could extend all 
collective agreements at the request of employers or trade unions.216 It is submitted that these 
extensions occurred without hassle. This, and the fact  that collective agreements remained  
effective until a new one was concluded resulted in more agreements being signed.217 
In the year 2011 Portugal’s economy took a downturn and an aid rescue package was 
extended to the country was given aid by the International Monetary Fund and European 
Union.218Consequently, Portugal was obliged to sign a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) with the Troika which consists of the International Monetary Fund, European 
Commission and the Central Bank.219 The purpose of the MoU was to reduce labour costs 
and support the ability of wages to be easily changed, depending on the situation for 
individual enterprises.220Portugal was obligated to describe the standards for the extension of 
sectoral collective agreements to those not associated to the negotiating organisations. 
Portugal implemented a requirement by means of a Resolution of the Council of Ministers.221 
The terms of this regulation were that collective agreements could only be extended if the 
firms that are represented by the employers’ organisations employed at least half of the 
workers in the region, industry or occupation to which the agreement applies.222 However, 
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Resolution 90/2012 allowed for exemptions in that the extension request did not include very 
small and medium-sized enterprises.223 
The Portuguese government put into effect changes to conditions in the labour market. One 
of the changes was that the request for extensions should not include very small and medium 
sized enterprises. The changes were supposed to be effected following consultations amongst 
social partners but the Portuguese government implemented this standard unilaterally.224 Not 
surprisingly, the measures however were met with a lot of animosity and resistance on the 
part of both employers and employees who viewed this criteria as too restrictive.  Trade 
unions also opposed the new dispensation which sought to exclude small and medium 
enterprises225 In addition to the new measures, the government made an effort to introduce 
“organized decentralization” so as to uphold enterprise level bargaining. In the year 2012, 
amendments were done to the Labour code with the introduction of Law 23/2012.The law 
stated that workers councils would be able to negotiate at enterprise level where the firm 
would employ a minimum of 150 employees unlike previously when a minimum threshold of 
250 employees was required.226 
The upholding of company level bargaining and the introduction of representative criteria in 
Portugal seem to have had an adverse effect on sectoral bargaining in Portugal.227 In most 
sectors, firms that belong to the employers’ organisations do not employ half the employees 
in the sector. This made extensions unlikely to occur.228 There was a marked reduction in the 
number of collective agreements that were extended after 2011. In addition, bargaining 
council coverage declined to less than 10%.229 
Following to the intense criticism of the Portugese government from trade unions and 
employer’s organisations, the former passed Resolution 43/2014.230 This Resolution amended 
the representivity’s criteria so that extensions would be feasible if the signatory employers’ 
organisation members employed half the employees in that sector.231 Portugese companies 
are generally small, and medium sized. This means that most employers’ organisations could 
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conclude collective agreements which are capable of extension.232 As this is a new 
amendment, the effects of collective bargaining in Europe are yet to be seen. There is, 
however, evidence of a reversal of this trend since 2014.233 
The extensions that characterise the Portuguese extensions regime most likely compromising 
the entire system of voluntary collective bargaining.234  At face value it would appear that the 
limitations violate the principles that underpin ILO Convention 98 on account of the reasons 
mentioned earlier in this chapter. It is submitted that this writer does not, however, concur 
that this regulation violates ILO Convention 98. In 2003, the Portuguese government had 
already introduced a regulatory framework that was more favourable to employers in 
collective bargaining.235It is submitted that a comprehensive analysis of the factors that are 
likely to have contributed to the reduction in the number of collective agreements be 
undertaken in isolation. The danger is, however, that there might be a propensity to want to 
circumvent the strict requirements for representation in the quest to increase the number of 
extensions of collective agreements. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
The brief analysis in this chapter serves the purpose of placing South Africa’s extension of 
collective agreements within the international and global context. It is submitted that 
extensions in South Africa should be strict and should only be operationalised where   there is 
majority support for the collective agreement. It would seem South Africa’s legislation 
supports sectoral level bargaining while the circumstances in Europe would be more 
amenable to the provisions of section 32(5) of the LRA. The impact of decentralisation on the 
extension of collective agreements is yet to be seen. Countries like Germany, which have a 
prerequisite of majority representative by the signatory employer parties as a prerequisite 
may have to discard the standard in order to promote the extension of collective agreements. 
It is submitted that this writer does appreciate that strict requirements for extensions can 
become a catalyst for the decline in the number One has learnt that strict methods of 
extensions can cause a decline in the number of industrial collective agreements that are 
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signed. This was the situation in Germany and it resulted in a move from a strict extension 
procedure. In Portugal the decline in collective agreements seems to have been caused by 
decentralisation. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Conclusion  
This study seeks to, inter alia, examine whether section 32 (5) violates certain rights that are 
enshrined in the bill of rights. 236There was a discussion on how the principle of democracy 
should be considered when taking into consideration whether or not the extension of 
collective agreements takes into account the interests of everyone involved.237 The extension 
of collective agreements also needed to be critically examined bearing in the view of the fact 
that there is no constitutional obligation to bargain.238 ILO Recommendation 91 is in support 
of the extension of collective agreements even where the requirement for representation of 
the majority of the affected parties has not been achieved.239 The same recommendation is in 
support of the representative standards found in section 32(5) of the LRA. The CFA, 
however, conveys, concerns over how minority organisations bind majority organisations to 
collective agreements. According to ILO standards, member states have the discretion to 
make a decision on what the suitable level of collective bargaining is.240 One was not able to 
find any direction from the principles in the ILO as to what can be termed as compromise 
collective bargaining at sectoral level. Generally, the ILO standards do not provide much by 
way of guidance although upholding of the notion of majoritarianism is upheld in the findings 
of the ILO. 
Section 32(2) is inconsistent with the Constitution because the courts lack adequate review 
power to strike down an extension of a collective agreement by the Minister.241 Section 32(5) 
does not seem to be consistent with the principle of majoritarianism. It is submitted that 
where the rights of the majority are infringed to give way to the will of the minority, then the 
principles of majoritarianism are disregarded and thus infringement is not reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. 
While majoritarianism is not a rigid rule, it does pave the way for organised collective 
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bargaining and warranting of fair labour practices.242 A discussion of the ministerial 
discretion that is continued in section 32(5) attempts to demonstrate how that arrangement 
seems to fail to achieve the intended goal. 243Ministerial discretion also seems to be 
susceptible to manipulation and judgement error as seen by cited cases where the Minister 
made an error of judgement which cast doubt on the validity of the extensions. Section 32(5) 
gives the Minister discretion in two respects and he or she may not grant the extension if this 
requirement is not satisfied. The first is deciding if the bargaining council is sufficiently 
representative within the sector. The second is whether a failure to extend the agreement may 
therefore undermine collective bargaining at sectoral level.244The first aspect of this 
discretion entails that in order to remain a registered bargaining council; the bargaining 
council must already be considered representative.245In light of this, it can be seen that the 
Minister does not really have discretion where the first aspect is concerned. With regards to 
the second part of the discretion, one submits that the term “undermining collective 
bargaining” is so porous that its observance is all but impossible to police.246Thus, the 
discretion to be exercised is framed in subjective terms. This makes the resulting decisions 
difficult to review on grounds of rationality and reasonableness.247 It is therefore submitted 
that section 32(5) of the LRA is an infringement on the rights to fair labour practices such as 
the right to strike action, freedom of association and to engage into collective bargaining.248 
Section 23 does not specify at what level sectoral level bargaining should take place. 
Although the LRA upholds collective bargaining,249 its purposes  can still be fulfilled through 
section 32(2) of the LRA .The statement that section 32(5) infringes on constitutional values 
does not entail that there should also be a challenge to section 1(d) (ii).250In countries such as 
Portugal and Germany, it would appear that there is resistance with regards to extensions 
where sectoral level is being preferred. These countries have loosened the strict condition that 
there should be 50% representativity. While one submits that section 32(5) of the constitution 
goes against majoritarianism, a suggestion to maintain section 32(5) seems to tally with the 
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standpoint espoused in other countries which have the same policy of sectoral level 
bargaining.251 
 
5.2 Recommendations 
It is submitted that section 32(2) can be rectified by restoring to the Minister a general 
discretion constrained by a duty to act in the public interest.252It is also submitted that section 
32(5) (a) and (b) should be removed from the LRA. What should be maintained is an 
extension where the parties in the bargaining council represent the majority of the industry. 
Sections 32(3) (c) and (d) should also be amended so that representation of the parties to the 
agreement and not the parties to the bargaining councils is considered. The ministers over-
bearing discretionary powers should be curtailed so that they are in sync with sections 32(3) 
of the LRA which is neutral.253The crux of the FMF constitutional challenge, as noted earlier, 
concerned the limited scope of judicial review, the other angle to it is the contention that the 
scheme amounts to an excessive delegation of legislative power to a private actor who is not 
obliged to act in the public interest and the claim that such too is inconsistent with the rule of 
law requirement in section 1 of the Constitution.254 As Mr Brassey SC, counsel for the FMF, 
put it, the bargaining councils in effect enjoy legislative power even though, they are not 
public instrumentalities bound by law to pursue their self interest and do so.255 It is submitted 
that a solution to this would be to bestow a discretionary power on the Minister requiring her 
to act in the public interest when deciding to extend a collective agreement under section 32 
of the LRA.Section 32(5) (c) and (d) which gives non-parties to present comments must be 
preserved and form part of the process for an extension of a collective agreement in terms of 
sections 32(2) and 32(3) of the LRA. The parties to the bargaining council should, however, 
be obligated to evaluate the comments and decide whether amendments are necessary. If 
deletion of section 32(5) considered undesirable, then maybe an adoption of the policy that 
obtains in Portugal could be a viable option. This is the policy that was recently introduced in 
Portugal whereby the signatory parties to a collective agreement do not necessarily represent 
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the majority of workers in an industry. This implies that the collective agreement will be 
capable of extension. 
South Africa can draw lessons from the situation in Germany and Portugal. The decline in the 
number of applicable collective agreements has been met with a lot of hostility in Portugal. 
The Portuguese, however, seem to share an unspoken consensus that, if  collective bargaining 
is to be upheld at sectoral level, then the conditions that militate extensions, such as the need 
for representation of half of the workforce, should be discarded. This reinforces the need to 
preserve section 32(5) of the LRA in its present form as it upholds Du Toits argument that a 
challenge to section 32 (5) of the LRA means that a similar challenge should be lodged 
against section 1 (d) (ii) of the LRA.256 
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